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LABOR AND THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS* 
Harry Shulmant 
THIS year marks the 50th anni-versary of the birth of the Sherman Law.1 Before the stat-
ute was three years old, in the seventh 
proceeding under it instituted by the 
government, labor activities in the 
course of a strike of transportation 
workers in Louisiana were enjoined as 
violative of its prohibitions.2 From 
that day to the present the Sherman 
Law has been successfully invoked 
against labor activities in a great 
variety of cases. 3 The Clayton Act of 
1914,4 that "industrial magna charta" 
whose words were regarded by Samuel 
Gompers as "sledge ha!Il!ller blows to 
the wrongs and injustices so long 
inflicted upon the workers"5 and which 
President Wilson characterized as giv-
ing "a veritable emancipation" to "the 
working men of America, 6 was found 
* This is, with some revisions, a talk delivered 
at Northwestern University School of Law, Feb-
ruary 8, 1940, as part of a symposium on the 
anti-trust laws provided on the Rosenthal Lec-
tures Foundation. 
t A.B. 1923, Brown University; LL.B. 1926, 
S.J.D. 1927, Harvard University. Professor of 
Law, Yale University School of Law. 
1 Act of July 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 209. 
2 United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated 
Council, 54 Fed. 994 (E. D. La. 1893), 57 Fed. 85 
(C. C. A. 5th, 1893). The petition was filed on 
March 25, 1893, an injunction issued on the same 
day, and the decree was affirmed on June 13, 
1893. U. S. Dept. of Justice, The Federal Anti-
Trust Laws (1938) 84. 
in fact to be important for what "it 
does not authorize"7 and to be "merely 
declaratory of what was the best prac-
tice always."8 Its practical significance 
came to be the addition of a remedy 
of a private suit for injunction under 
the Sherman Law to the original 
remedies of criminal prosecution, gov-
ernment suit for injunction and private 
action for treble damages-a change of 
considerable importance since about 
half of the proceedings against labor 
under the anti-trust laws after 1914 
have been private injunction suits 
under the Clayton Act.9 The result 
was, as observed by Professor Frank-
furter in 1930, that whatever uncer-
tainty there may be about the effec-
tiveness of the Sherman law with 
respect to "industrial combinations" 
and "economic forces," "there can be 
3 The cases through 1929 are collected in Ap-
pendices B and C of Berman, Labor and the 
Sherman Act (1930). The proceedings instituted 
by the Government are listed in the Federal 
Anti-Trust Laws, supra note 2. See also Com-
ment (1940) 49 Yale L. J. 518. 
4 Oct. 15, 1914, c. 323, 38 Stat. 730. 
s Quoted in Frankfurter and Greene, The La-
bor Injunction (1930) 143. 
s Quoted in Frankfurter and Greene, op cit. 
supra note 5, at 143, n. 36. 
7 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 
u. s. 443, 469 (1921). 
s American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cen-
tral Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 203 (1921). 
9 Berman, Labor and the Sherman Act (1930) 
219. 
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no doubt of its potency as a restraint 
upon the activities of organized labor 
. . . . when all discounts [for "the 
inadequacies of labor leadership" and 
"the consequences of economic forces"] 
are made, it is common ground among 
students of the Sherman Law, as well 
as among industrial and labor leaders, 
that it has been one of the strongest 
influences counteracting trade union-
ism in the United States."10 
Yet, during the entire life of the 
federal anti-trust laws, organized labor 
has not only complained of undue 
harshness in their application to labor 
but has insisted that it has been com-
pletely exempted from them and, in-
deed, that it was never intended to be 
subject to them. At the present term 
of the Supreme Court, in the Chicago 
Milk case,11 counsel for the A. F. of L. 
elaborately argued its claim of im-
munity. The Court held that the con-
tention that "the Sherman Act does 
not apply to labor unions or labor 
union activities [was] not open on this 
appeal" because of the "restrictions of 
the Criminal Appeals Act" under 
which its jurisdiction was invoked.12 
Judicial reconsideration of labor's 
claim was thus postponed, but the stage 
for reconsideration is being set and 
labor is in the meantime loudly pro-
claiming its absolute immunity. "Re-
consideration" may not be the appro-
priate word; for, though the entire 
doctrine with reference to labor under 
the Sherman Law is judge made, the 
applicability of that law to labor activ-
10 Foreword to Bennan, Labor and the Sher-
man Act (1930) xiv. 
n United States v. Borden Co., 60 S. Ct. 182 (1939). 
12 60 s. Ct. 192. 
ities has really never been thoroughly 
considered in opinions of the Supreme 
Court, or, indeed, of the lower federal 
courts. 
In the Danbury Hatters case of 
1908,13 the Supreme Court decided for 
the first time, and definitively, that the 
Law was applicable. Later cases ac-
cepted the holding without question 
and built on it as a foundation. The 
whole structure is an inverted pyramid 
resting on that case. But even there 
the issue was little considered. The 
opinion of the Court, written by Chief 
Justice Fuller, does little more than 
assert the conclusion. True, said the 
Court, adopting the language of the 
Louisiana federal court in the first 
government labor case14 under the Act, 
"the statute had its origin in the evils 
of massed capital." But as finally 
worded, it prohibited "every" contract, 
combination or conspiracy in restraint 
of trade. It "made no distinction be-
tween classes." The several efforts 
made in Congress "to exempt . . . 
organizations of farmers and laborers 
from the operation of the act . . . 
failed, so that the act remained as we 
have it before us."15 "Every" meant 
every, not some (this was, of course, 
three years before the Supreme Court 
decided in the Standard Oil case16 that 
every meant not every but some). The 
Danbury Hatters' combination sought 
to "compel" Loewe "involuntarily not 
to engage in the course of trade except 
on conditions that the combination" 
1a Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1908). 
14 Supra, note 2. 
15 208 u. s. 301. 
16 Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States, 
221 u. s. 1 (1911). 
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imposed.17 The trade attacked was 
interstate. Therefore the combination 
violated the statute. With only these 
few sentences of mechanical reasoning 
from words, the Court justified its 
resolution of an explosive issue of 
public policy affecting fundamental 
social forces and the relation of state 
and federal power to them. 
The inadequacy of the Court's refer-
ence to Congressional. intent has been 
fully exposed.18 But if we cannot agree 
with those who say that Congress 
intended not to include labor within 
the prohibitions of the Sherman law, 
we can hardly fail to agree that there 
is no evidence that members of Con-
gress thought through the variety of 
labor activities upon which the statute 
might impinge and that Congress did 
not manifest any common understand-
ing or desire in the matter.19 That left 
merely the words of the statute, which 
as the Court enigmatically said "made 
no distinction between classes."20 The 
Court _apparently thought that there 
were but two solutions available: 
either labor unions enjoyed complete 
immunity from the Act, like unto the 
immunity of the sovereign, as some 
have claimed, or the Act restrained 
even bona fide labor activity for tra-
ditional labor ends. But orthodox 
standards for the meaning which courts 
may pour into empty vessels of legis-
17 208 u. s. 294. 
1s Berman, Labor and the Sherman Act (1930) 
3-54; Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor In-
junction (1930) 139, n. 17; Boudin, The Sherman 
Act and Labor Disputes (1939) 39 Col. L. Rev. 
1283, (1940) 40 Col. L. Rev. 14. Cf. Mason, Or-
ganized Labor and the Law (1925) 119 et seq. 
10 See Mason, Book Review (1931) 25 Am. Pol. 
Sci. Rev. 461; Landis, Book Review (1931) 44 
Harv. L. Rev. 875. 
20 208 u. s. 301. 
21 Except, indeed, for the purpose of excluding 
lation pointed to a third and more 
appropriate course. 
First, no labor octopus comparable 
to the then popular portrayal of the 
"trusts" was threatening the social 
welfare. The one indubitable proposi-
tion about Congressional intent in the 
Hatters opinion is that the statute "had 
its origin in the evils of massed cap-
ital." The growth of "trusts" with 
which the states seemed to be unable 
or unwilling to deal, particularly 
"trusts" in ordinary, household com-
modities, led to a clamor for federal 
legislation. The Congressional debates 
concerned themselves with that prob-
lem. There was no public clamor for 
suppression of "evils" of organized 
labor; and Congress did not direct its 
attention to any such issue.21 
Second, there was no lack of existing 
law to protect against the evils of or-
ganized labor. Statutes and common 
law, criminal and civil liability, already 
restrained concerted action by labor. 
Indeed, the dominant complaint was 
that the legal restrictions were too 
stringent and that some release was 
necessary.22 
Third, there was no occasion for fed-
eral action. The States had shown no 
incompetence or unwillingness to deal 
with improper action by organized la-
bor. No difficulties of foreign incor-
poration, extraterritorial power Or· in-
labor combinations from the enactment. See 
supra, note 18. 
22 See Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor In-
junction (1930) 4, 137. It was only fifty years 
earlier that Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. 1ll 
(Mass., 1842) held a trade union not to be per se 
a criminal conspiracy. Sinillar determinations 
in other states came later. But all such de-
cisions merely permitted unions to act for proper 
ends and with proper means. Impropriety on 
either score subjected the actors to criminal and 
civil liability. 
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terstate commerce stood in the way 
of effective local action, as was the 
case with respect to the "trusts." And 
no undue tolerance of labor action had 
been manifested by the state govern-
ments.23 Federal action might, indeed, 
have been necessary to protect con-
certed action by labor, as later history 
showed, 24 but local law provided ample 
punishment for it. 
Fourth, a labor union necessarily 
restrains competition between laborers 
in the sale of their services. Its chief 
function is to unite workingmen in 
their demands and substitute the 
strength of combination for the weak-
ness of individuals. Yet it was alto-
gether incredible that Congress could 
have been willing to prohibit the for-
mation and existence of labor unions 
for the purpose of improving labor 
conditions; and no one has asserted 
that the Sherman Law does that. But 
if the Act permitted such restraint by 
labor combinations, what labor action 
did it prohibit? Nothing in the Act 
supplied even a hint of differentiation 
between some labor aims and others or 
between some labor activities and 
others. To be sure, the Act provided 
very little guidance even with respect 
to business combinations. But there 
was at least that little. Prevention of 
monopoly and preservation of competi-
tion were the known goals to be pro-
tected, however uncertain may have 
been their location or the nature of the 
prohibited attacks. With respect to la-
bor combinations, however, not even 
23 The judicial language in some of the labor 
cases of that period rivals that of any anti-
unionist in the severity of its condemnation. 
See Comment (1940) 49 Yale L. J. 518, 523. 
2~ E. g., Erdman Act, June 1, 1898, c. 370, 30 
the goals were fixed. Was the Court, 
then, to duplicate the law of the States 
and pour into the Sherman Act the 
whole of the common law relating to 
labor disputes? Was it, without any 
light from the statute, to create in its 
name a federal law to govern labor 
aims and labor actions? 
Such considerations point to a lim-
itation of the Sherman Law to 1hat 
for which it affords some guidance, 
and which is concededly its historic 
object, namely, combinations of busi-
ness. That would not require "distinc-
tions between classes" and exemption 
of labor unions. On the contrary, to 
the extent that labor would participate 
in such combinations, it would be liable 
along with its partners. If, for ex-
ample, labor unions were to boycott an 
employer in order to compel him to 
join an illegal conspiracy of other em-
ployers to fix prices, or restrict produc-
tion or allocate business, they would 
be liable along with the employers. 
But, by the same token, they would 
not be liable for bona fide labor activ-
ity which does not look to restraint of 
trade by employers and does not sub-
ject the employers to liability under 
the Act. 
The facts of the Hatters case provide 
a striking illustration. The contro-
versy between the employer and the 
union was a labor dispute of tradi-
tional type. It concerned itself solely 
with terms and conditions of employ-
ment. Monopolization, tampering with 
prices or other restriction of competi-
Stat. 424, declared unconstitutional in part in 
Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 (1908); Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, July 5, 1935, c. 372, 
49 Stat. 449. 
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tion in the manufacture or sale of hats 
was no part of the union's aims or of 
the expectable results of its action. 
The public interest in the preservation 
of competition in business was neither 
harmed nor threatened. The union's 
activity was directed solely toward co-
ercing the employer to employ union 
men on terms widely adopted in his 
industry. State law provided numer-
ous safeguards against unjustifiable 
harm to the employer. Under estab-
lished local law both the union's aims 
and methods had to pass the tests of 
legality. The union's demand of the 
employer had to be one which it was 
entitled to make; and there were a 
number of limitations upon the types 
of permissible demands.25 But even 
for a permissible demand various forms 
of concerted action were forbidden, in-
cluding probably some of the action 
actually taken by the union.26 Yet, into 
this already law-ridden field, the Court 
chose to inject the Sherman Law.27 
Six years after this decision Con-
gress passed the Clayton Act. 28 Sec-
tions 6 and 20 were direct responses to 
organized labor's cries for relief from 
the Sherman Law and from judicial 
25 For the legality of the closed shop in Con-
necticut, see Cohn & Roth Electric Co. v. Brick-
layers, etc. Union, 92 Conn. 161, 101 Atl. 659 
(1917). 
2s Apparently the union boycotted not only 
the product but also dealers who sold the prod-
uct. As to this, see Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 
N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937); People v. 
Bellows, 281 N. Y. 67, 22 N. E. (2d) 479 (1939). 
27 See the characterization of this decision by 
Assistant Attorney General (now Attorney Gen-
eral) Jackson, quoted in Arnold, Folklore of 
Capitalism (1937) 212, n. 2. 
2a Supra, note 4. 
29 Cf. the address of W. H. Taft (1914) 39 A. 
B. A. Rep. 359, 380. 
so "That the labor of a human being is not a 
commodity or article of commerce. Nothing 
control. Judging by the jubilation the 
Act produced in labor's ranks and 
among its friends in Congress, th~ 
promise to the hope of labor9 was 
immunity from the anti-trust laws at 
least along the lines I have indicated. 
The language of Section 630 does not 
convey very precise meaning. But in 
the Duplex31 case the Supreme Court 
rendered it meaningless. It held that 
the "section assumes the normal ob-
jects of a labor organization to be legit-
imate and declares that nothing in the 
anti-trust laws shall be construed to 
forbid the existence and operation of 
such organizations or to forbid their 
members from lawfully carrying out 
their legitimate objects," but does not 
authorize illegitimate objects or un-
lawful means, and particularly it does 
not authorize an out and out conspir-
acy in restraint of trade.32 Now the 
endeavor of the defendants in the Du-
plex case was to unionize the plain-
tiff's plant. Unionization is of course 
an historic, normal object of labor un-
ions33 and therefore a legitimate object 
under Section 6. There is no sugges-
tion to the contrary in the Court's opin-
ion. The issue therefore was whether 
contained in the anti-trust laws shall be con-
strued to forbid the existence and operation of 
labor . . . organizations . • • or to forbid or 
restrain individual members of such organiza-
tions from lawfully carrying out the legitimate 
objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or 
the members thereof, be held or construed to be 
illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint 
of trade, under the anti-trust laws." For the 
history of this Section, see Frankfurter and 
Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930) 140-46. 
31 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 
U. S. 443 (1921). Mr. Justice Pitney delivered 
the opinion of the Court. Mr. Justice Brandeis 
wrote a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice 
Holmes and Mr. Justice Clarke concurred. 
82 254 U. S. 469. The emphasis is the Court's. 
88 See 4 Restatement of Torts (1939) §785, Com-
ments a and b, §788, Comments b and c. 
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this legitimate object was being "law-
fully" carried out. The Court held the 
conduct unlawful, not because it vio-
lated state law (it probably didn't) 34 or 
because it violated some federal law 
other than the anti-trust act, but pre-
cisely because the conduct restrained 
trade in violation of the Sherman Law. 
Legality or illegality "at common law 
or under the statutes of particular 
States" was "of minor consequence."35 
Thus the Court made Section 6 say 
that nothing in the anti-trust laws shall 
be construed to forbid union members 
from carrying out union objects which 
do not violate the anti-trust laws in a 
manner which does not violate them. 
This did not, of course, completely 
emasculate the Section. These "sledge 
hammer blows" to labor's wrongs and 
injustices, 36 "that the labor of a human 
being is not a commodity or article of 
commerce," were still left to be struck 
by any orator on suitable occasion. And 
left, too, was the declaration that a 
labor union is not per se a combination 
or conspiracy in restraint of trade-a 
proposition which practically no one 
had denied. 
Section 20 is more specific and de-
tailed. Among other things it pro-
vides that: " ... in any case between 
an employer and employees, or be-
tween employers and employees, or 
betWeen employees, or between per-
sons employed and persons seeking 
employment, involving, or growing 
out of, a dispute concerning terms 
or conditions of employment . . . no 
. . . restraining order or injunction 
shall prohibit any person or persons, 
84 See Boss~:rt v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 
582 (1917). 
whether singly or in concert, from ter-
minating any relation of employment, 
or from ceasing to perform any work 
or labor, or from . . . persuading oth-
ers by peaceful means so to do; or 
from ceasing to patronize or to em-
ploy any party to such dispute, or 
from . . . persuading others by peace-
ful and lawful means so to do; . . . 
nor shall any of the acts specified in 
this paragraph be considered or held 
to! be violations of any law of the 
United States." 
One chief aim of this Section was 
to curb the use of federal injunctions 
in industrial disputes, no matter what 
basis of federal jurisdiction was in-
voked; to control the system of "gov-
ernment by injunction" against which 
there had been loud protest from la-
bor and from legal and lay circles gen-
erally. "Aside from the use of the 
injunction, the chief sources of dissat-
isfaction with the existing law," wrote 
Mr. Justice Brandeis, "lay in the doc-
trine of malicious combinations, and, 
in many parts of the country, in the 
judicial declarations of the illegality 
at common law of picketing and per-
suading others to leave work. . . . . . 
"By 1914 the ideas of the advocates 
of legislation had fairly crystallized 
upon the manner in which the inequal-
ity and uncertainty of the law should 
be removed. It'was to be done by ex-
pressly legalizing certain acts regard-
less ·of the effects produced by them 
upon other persons. . . . The resulting 
law set out certain acts which had pre-
viously been held unlawful, whenever 
courts had disapproved of the ends for 
35 254 u. s. 466. 
86 Supra, note 5. 
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which they were performed; it then 
declared that, when these acts were 
committed in the cotirse of an indus-
trial dispute, they should not be held 
to violate any law of the United States. 
In other words the Clayton Act sub-
stituted the opinion of Congress as to 
the propriety of the purpose for that 
of differing judges; . . . "37 
The majority of the Court in the 
Duplex case also took a serious view 
of the Act. Section 20, it said "imposes 
an exceptional and extraordinary re-
striction upon the equity powers of the 
courts of the United States and upon 
the general operation of the anti-trust 
laws, a restriction in the nature of a 
special privilege or immunity to a par-
ticular class, with corresponding detri-
ment to the general public; ... " There-
fore a "loose construction of the sec-
tion" was to be avoided and "the quali-
fying words that are found in it" were 
not to be slighted. The "exceptional 
privilege" was limited by the act to 
cases between "employers and employ-
ees . . . involving or growing out of 
a dispute concerning terms or condi-
tions of employment." Giving "full and 
fair effect" to "every word" required 
the privilege to "be confined-as the 
natural meaning of the words confines 
it-to those who are proximately and 
substantially concerned as parties to 
an actual dispute respecting the terms 
or conditions of their own employment, 
past, present, or prospective . . . . and 
it would do violence to the guarded 
language employed were the exemp-
tion extended beyond the parties a£-
81 254 u. s. 484-86. 
38 254 u. s. 472. 
so These facts are stated in the dissenting, not 
fected in a proximate and substantial, 
not merely a sentimental or sympa-
thetic, sense by the cause of dispute."38 
As applied to the particular case, this 
meant that the members of the Inter-
national Association of Machinists, 
then an organization of some 60,000, 
could not refuse to install, handle or 
repair, or persuade others not to 
handle, install or repair in New York 
printing presses manufactured by the 
Duplex Printing Press Co. in Michi-
gan. This despite the knowledge that 
the Machinists' action was due to the 
fact that Duplex, one of the only four 
manufacturers of presses in the United 
States, refused to recognize the union 
or abide by its standards of hours and 
minimum wages, with the result that 
its three competitors threatened to 
sever their relations with the·union and 
to reduce their terms of employment 
to the lower level maintained by Du-
plex.39 
In the Bedford Stone Cutters case/0 
the Court further confined the "ex-
ceptional privilege" granted by the 
Clayton Act. There the plaintiffs 
shipped 70 per cent of all the cut stone 
in the country. They were organized 
in a local and national employers' or-
ganization. The stonecutters' national 
union on the other side was only 5,000 
strong. The average number of mem-
bers in the local unions was only 33. 
The plaintiffs had had collective agree-
ments with the union, but, following a 
dispute which resulted in a strike and 
a lockout, the plaintiffs refused to deal 
with the union any longer and organ-
the majority, opinion. 
-1o Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen 
Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37 (1927). 
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ized an unaffiliated company union. 
The concerted action of the stonecut-
ters complained of in the case con-
sisted only of their own peaceful re-
fusal to work on stone produced in 
plaintiffs' quarries. No other crafts 
were called to their aid and no coer-
cion, intimidation or other kind of boy-
cott was involved. Yet the Court held 
the defendants' conduct violative of the 
Sherman Law and not within the pur-
view of the Clayton Act. 41 
In this construction of §20 of the 
Clayton Act, the Court committed its 
cardinal sin against labor policy. Other 
courts in their moulding of the com-
mon law were beginning to recognize 
the community of interest among 
workingmen of the same craft, or of 
the same industry or organization. 42 
Apart from the Clayton Act, the Su-
preme Court itself in the Tri-City 
case43 was of opinion that "the mem-
bers of a local labor union and the 
union itself ... have sufficient interest 
in the wages paid to the employees of 
41 The opinion of the Court was delivered by 
Mr. Justice Sutherland. Mr. Justice Sanford 
concurred in the result "upon the controlling 
authority" of the Duplex case, supra note 31, 
which he was ''unable to distinguish." 274 U. S. 
55. Mr. Justice Stone was of opinion that both 
"as an original proposition" and in the light of 
the Clayton Act and the Standard Oil (supra, 
note 16) and American Tobacco (221 U. S. 106) 
cases, the defendants' action was not a violation 
of the Sherman Law. But since this view was 
rejected in the Duplex case and again in the 
instant case, he concurred with the majority. 
274 U. S. 55. Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote a dis-
senting opinion in which Mr. Justice Holmes 
concurred. 257 U. S. 56. This opinion pointed 
to many facts which might suffice to distinguish 
the Duplex case; and it urged that such restraint 
as was found in the case was reasonable under 
the circumstances. The opinion did not go over 
again the ground already lost in Duplex, that 
the case involved conduct in the course of a 
labor dispute which §20 of the Clayton Act legal-
ized, regardless of reasonableness. The dissent-
ing opinions in these two cases establish, then, 
two lines of defense: one, that the conduct is 
any employer in the community to jus-
tify their use of lawful and peaceful 
persuasion to induce those employees 
to refuse to accept such reduced 
wages and to quit their employ-
ment."44 The Court's failure to recog-
nize such community of interest and 
solidarity of labor groups in its inter-
pretation of the anti-trust laws of-
fended the trend of the times and the 
developing history of labor policy.46 
Protest against what came to be called 
the "judicial emasculation of the Clay-
ton Act" was immediate and strong. 
But it took until 1932, 11 years af-ter 
the Duplex case and five years after 
the Bedford case, for remedial legisla-
tion to be finally enacted in the form 
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.46 This, 
as the Supreme Court said in 1938, 
was intended "further to extend the 
prohibitions of the Clayton Act re-
specting the exercise of jurisdiction by 
the federal courts and to obviate the 
results of the judicial construction of 
that Act."47 
legal under §20 without inquiry into its purpose; 
the other, that if proper purpose is a requisite of 
legality, that requisite is found in the case. 
42 See 4 Restatement,of Torts (1939) §§802-805. 
43 American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cen-
tral Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184 (1921). 
44 257 U. S. 212. (Italics added.) The court 
divided the defendants into two classes: those 
who were "employees" within §20 of the Clayton 
Act and those who were not. But the Court 
accorded the same privileges to both. 
45 For discussion of the other labor cases un-
der the Clayton Act, see Frankfurter and 
Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930) 165-76. 
46 March 23, 1932, c. 90, 47 Stat. 70. See Frank-
furter and Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930) 
199-228; Frankfurter and Greene, Congressional 
Power Over The Labor Injunction (1931) 31 
Col. L. Rev. 385. 
47 New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery, 
Inc., 303 U. S. 552, (1938). The Norris-La 
Guardia Act is, of course, not limited to cases 
under the anti-trust laws. It applies in all cases 
no matter what basis of federal jurisdiction is 
invoked. 
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No canon of statutory interpretation 
required the Court so to retard the cur-
rent of labor history. Judges like 
Holmes/8 Brandeis,49 Clarke,fi0 Stone,51 
Hough, 52 Learned Hand, 53 found in the 
Clayton Act a meaning different from 
that which prevailed.54 Adoption of 
the views of the dissenting judges 
would not have meant complete legal-
ization of the dreaded "secondary boy-
cott." In the first place, exemption from 
the anti-trust laws would have left that 
activity still subject to the control of 
state law. But perhaps even more 
important, was the error of speaking 
of "secondary boycott" without dis-
crimination between the variety of sit-
uations which are sometimes denomin-
ated by that label. The dissenting opin-
ions in the Duplex and ~edford cases 
indicated several safeguards against 
unduly oppressive boycotts short of 
blindness to a community of interest 
which long history confirmed. 
No rational principle of labor policy 
-except possibly the policy that labor 
unions must "not be strong"-:-can har-
monize the many decisions of the fed-
eral courts in labor cases under the 
anti-trust laws.fi5 The "rule of reason" 
has guided anti-trust decisions '\vith re-
spect to combinations of capital since 
1911. Common law adjudications in 
cases arising out of industrial disputes 
concern themselves with the propriety 




s1 Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone 
Cutters' Ass'n, supra, notes 40 and 41. 
fi2 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 252 
Fed. 722, 745 CC. C. A. 2d, 1918). 
53 Id., at 748. 
5·1 See also Judge A. N. Hand in Aeolian Co. 
v. Fischer, 40 F. (2d) 189, 193-94 (C. C. A. 2d, 
1930) and Judge Thacher in the same case be-
of the objects and means involved in 
the particular situation. Concerted 
action which is illegal for one purpose 
may be legal if its purpose is some-
thing else. Differentiation is made be-
tween the means by which the purpose 
is sought to be accomplished, whether, 
for example, by moral persuasion, 
economic pressure, fraud or violence. 
Considerations of fairness in the given 
case as well as those of public policy 
with respect to the general type of ac-
tivity play a part in adjudication. But, 
in the labor cases under the anti-trust 
acts, we are told, the question was 
merely whether the defendants' con-
duct, by intention or direct conse-
quence restrained interstate trade or 
commerce. "A restraint of interstate 
commerce," said the Supreme Court, 
"cannot be justified by the fact that 
the ultimate object of the partici-
pants was to secure an ulterior bene-
fit which they might have been at lib-
erty to pursue by means not involving 
such restraint."G6 Differences such as 
that between offensive and defensive 
union action, between a large union co-
ercing a small employer and a small 
union defending against a strong asso-
ciation of employers, between action by 
employees united by a single craft or 
union and that by employees having 
lesser ties of community of interest,-
such differences were, as the Bedford 
low, 35 F. (2d) 34 CS. D. N. Y., 1929). 
55 See supra, note 3; Landis, Cases on Labor 
Law (1934) 495 et seq. 
56 Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone 
Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37, 47 (1927). This is a 
familiar bit of question begging. The statement 
would be platitudinous if it referred only to il-
legal restraints or if all restraints were illegal. 
But since only unreasonable restraints are il-
legal, the question is not whether an illegal 
restraint may be thus justified but whether a 
restraint thus justified is unreasonable. 
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dissent deplored, not deemed impor-
tant. 
Again, a doctrinaire, physical con-
ception of interstate commerce made 
no rational adjustment of state and na-
tional power in this field. Effect on 
interstate commerce was not decisive 
of federal jurisdiction. The question 
was whether the effect was the in-
tended or the direct result of the con-
duct. Thus refusal by union men to 
work on a building with the non-union 
employees of an out of state manufac-
turer who were installing in the build-
ing an unassembled organ shipped 
from the other state was a violation 
of the Sherman Law. 57 But the re-
fusal of union men to work on a build-
ing with non-union employees of an 
out of state employer who were erect-
ing the structural steel shipped from 
the other state was so clearly not a 
violation as not even to raise a sub-
stantial federal question.58 In the first 
case the interstate commerce involved, 
said the court, was the purchase of an 
organ-not of parts-and accordingly 
the transaction was not complete until 
the organ was installed. In the second 
case the interstate transaction was not 
the purchase of a steel frame build-
ing but of just structural steel; ac-
cordingly, that transaction was com-
plete upon delivery of the steel, and 
its erection was no part of interstate 
57 Aeolian Co. v. Fischer, 40 F. (2d) 189 (C. 
c. A. 2d, 1930). 
58 Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U. 
S. 103 (1933) aff'g s. c., 61 F. (2d) 115 (C. C. A. 
2d, 1932). 
s9 United Leather Workers Int'l Union v. Her-
kert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U. S. 457 (1924) ; 
United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado 
Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922) ; Coronado Coal Co. 
v. United Mine Workers of America, 268 U. S. 
295 (1925). 
commerce. Again, a strike against an 
employer for a "local purpose," such 
as higher wages, was beyond the juris-
diction of the Sherman Act, however 
unlawful the strikers' conduct or how-
ever substantial the amount of the· 
product which the cessation of produc-
tion kept from shipment in interstate 
commerce.59 But pickets who by in-
timidation of a truck driver prevented 
the interstate carriage of a single steel 
billet were convicted of a conspiracy 
in restraint of trade.6° Convicted also 
of this offense were railway employees 
in the Shopmen's Strike of 1922 who 
assaulted a station master (they were 
fined $25.00) ,61 others who sought to 
disable a locomotive by putting quick-
silver in its boiler,62 others who dyna-
mited a lin~ .of road,63 and members 
of the Progressive Miners Union who 
dynamited trains carrying coal mined 
by members of the United Mine Work-
ers.64 In each case the conduct charged 
was concededly criminal and punish-
able by penalties more stringent than 
those provided by the anti-trust laws. 
Of course, some more or less logical 
verbal formulae may be devised ;to 
reconcile these cases. But the point 
is that neither the decisions nor the 
formulae make any apportionment of 
the labor problems between state and 
national power on any basis of need 
or convenience. 
GO O'Brien v. United-States, 290 Fed. 185 (C. 
C. A. 6th, 1923). 
61 United States v. Harvel, W. D. La., Dec. 17, 
1923, Federal Anti-trust Laws (1938) 195. 
62 Williams v. United States, 295 Fed. 302 (C. 
C. A. 5th, 1923). C£. United States v. Heney, 
286 Fed. 165 (N. D. Tex., 1923). See Landis, 
Cases on Labor Law (1934) 515, n. 1, 521, n. 1. 
Ga Vandell v. United States, 6 F. (2d) 188 (C. 
C. A. 2d, 1925). 
6-l United States v. Anderson, 101 F. (2d) 325 
(C. C. A. 7th, 1939). 
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Only the limitations of the concept 
of the federal commerce power pre-
vented the Sherman law from becom-
ing a police measure for all industrial 
disputes. And when the Supreme 
Court redefined that concept in the 
N. L. R. A. cases,m• a Circuit Court of 
Appeals was at once ready to expand 
the scope of the Sherman Law in labor 
controversies. 66 That was erroneous, 
to be sure.67 But it is further evidence 
of the unpredictable, anomalous and 
uncontrolled way in which the anti-
trust laws may impinge upon labor un-
der the judicial precedents. The sit-
uation thus calls for reexamination-
particularly of the foundations upon 
which the entire structure rests, the 
Hatters case, the Duplex case and the 
Bedford case. Reexamination may be 
anticipated in view of the current read-
iness of the Supreme Court to prevent 
the continuation of its previous errors 
when the passage of time has served 
only further to expose the error and 
its continuance is not required for the 
proper protection of interests built in 
reasonable reliance on it.68 
The Department of Justice has be-
gun the process of reconsideration in 
its own sphere. In its current vigor-
ous effort to secure, as it states,69 a 
real and effective enforcement of the 
GG N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 
301 U. S. 1 (1937) ; N. L. R. B. v. Freuhauf Trailer 
Co., 301 U. S. 49 (1937); N. L. R. B. v. Friedman-
Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U. S. 58 (1937). 
sa Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 90 F. (2d) 155 
(C. C. A. 3d, 1937). See also Lake Valley Farm 
Products, Inc. v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, 
108 F. (2d) 436 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939). 
67 Leader v. Apex Hosiery Co., ... F. (2d) ... 
(C. C. A. 3d, 1939), certiorari granted, Feb. 26, 
1940, 8 U. S. L. Wk. 357. See Comment (1940) 
49 Yale L. J. 518, 525, and the dissenting opinion 
of Treanor, C. J. in Lake Valley Farm Products, 
federal anti-trust laws, the Department 
announced a planned and thought out 
"labor policy."70 In words reminiscent 
of the Clayton Act, the Department 
dealt its own "sledge hammer blows" 
to the earlier use of the Sherman Law. 
"The anti-trust laws," it says, "should 
not be used as an instrument to police 
strikes or adjudicate labor controver-
sies. The right of collective bargaining 
by labor unions is recognized by the 
anti-trust laws to be a reasonable exer-
cise of collective power. Therefore, we 
wish to make it clear that it is only 
such boycotts, strikes, or coercion by 
labor unions as have no reasonable 
connection with wages, hours, health, 
safety, the speed-up system, or the 
establishment and maintenance of the 
right of collective bargaining which 
will be prosecuted. . .. In our anxiety 
to be fair to labor we are not subject-
ing to criminal prosecution practices 
which can be justified even under the 
dissenting opinions of the United States 
Supreme Court."71 To indicate the ex-
tent of its self-restraint, the Depart-
ment cites examples. Thus it has "in-
structed the attorneys in the building 
investigation not to institute criminal 
prosecutions" for "refusals by unions 
to work upon goods made in non-union 
shops," though "in the past courts have 
Inc. v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, 108 F. (2d) 
436, 443 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939). 
68 See Helveririg v. Hallock, 60 S. Ct. 444, 451 
(1940). 
69 See Ann. Rep. of Atty. Gen. (1938) 13, 54-
59; Arnold, Fair and Effective Use of Present 
Anti-trust Procedure (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 1294. 
70 The statement, in the form of a letter from 
Assistant Attorney General Arnold to the Sec-
retary of the Central Labor Union of Indian-
apolis, was released as a "Public Statement" 
on Nov. 20, 1939, entitled "Application of the 
Anti-trust Laws to Labor Unions." 
n Public Statement, supra, note 70, at 1, 3. 
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held that such secondary boycotts are 
violations of the anti-trust laws," be-
cause in "the Duplex and Bedford Cut 
Stone cases a minority of the Supreme 
Court presented the argument against 
this view."72 Again, it has "consis-
tently disregarded all ... requests ... 
to proceed against unions because they 
maintain high rates of wages, because 
they strike to increase wages, and be-
cause they attempt to establish the 
closed shop."73 Apparently only a per-
missible "anxiety to be fair to labor" 
deters the use of the anti-trust laws 
against these historic practices of trade 
unionism. 
But with respect to practices which, 
in the Department's opinion, "are un-
questionable violations of the Sherman 
Act, supported by no responsible ju-
dicial authority whatever,"74 the De-
partment states it has "no choice"75 but 
to take action. The "unquestionable vi-
olations" listed are "unreasonable re-
straints" to : (1) "prevent the use of 
cheaper material, improved equipment, 
or more efficient methods," (2) "com-
pel the hiring of useless and unneces-
sary labor," (3) "enforce systems of 
graft and extortion," (4) "enforce ille-
gally fixed prices," and (5) "destroy 
an established and legitimate system of 
collective bargaining."76 
There is no novelty in the fact that 
the Government is proceeding against 
labor unions and their members under 
the anti-trust laws. Even during the 
present administration, before this "la-
bor policy" was announced and before 
Assistant Attorney-General Arnold 
12 Id., at 3, 4. 
7Sld., at 3. 
74ld., at 4. 
75 Id., at 3. 
was appointed, the Government 
brought at least ten indictments and 
one equity suit against practices of the 
kmd listed in the Department's state-
ment.17 Nor is the Department en-
gaged in a drive against labor unions. 
Their prosecution is merely incident to 
a wider attack on obstructions in com-
merce. The novelty lies in the fact 
of formulation and statement of a gen-
eral labor policy, the vigor of the ef-
fort at enforcement and the publicity 
with which the effort is attended. These 
circumstances bring a renewed empha-
sis on the application of the anti-trust 
laws to labor activities. 
The emphasis cannot be limited by 
the restrictions which the statement of 
policy announces. On the contrary, it 
extends to the full potential applica-
bility of these laws to labor. The an-
nounced restrictions can bind the De-
partment only so long as it wishes to 
be bound by them. The statement of 
policy virtually boasts of a self-re-
straint not required by judicial author-
ity; and it implicitly discloses how 
fully the applicability of the Sherman 
Law to union activity is still, after 
fifty years, dependent on the individ-
ual views of the persons who for the 
time being happen to be charged with 
its enforcement. And enforcement is 
not limited even to the changing per-
sonnel of the Department of Justice. 
Private suits for injunction or dam-
ages are still permitted. These may 
be encouraged by the emphasis on the 
Sherman Law and be aided by the 
government proceedings without being 
16 Id., 4-5. 
11 See Federal Anti-trust Laws (1938) 250, 252, 
253, 254, 255, 261, 262, 266. 
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limited by the Department's policy of 
self-restraint. The statement of policy 
urges that "unions stand to gain" by 
the government prosecutions because 
they will so educate the public as to 
relieve the unions from private suits 
at "the hands of those who may be 
hostile to organized labor itself."78 But 
surely this is a mirage produced by in-
toxication with self-generated enthu-
siasm. 
Sober reflection raises serious doubts 
as to both the legal basis and the wis-
dom of the announced policy, even 
though particular prosecutions thus 
far instituted may be entirely war-
ranted.79 The Department says that 
the classes of restraints listed in its 
statement are "unquestionable viola-
tions of the Sherman Act, supported by 
no responsible judicial authority what-
ever" and not justifiable "even under 
the dissenting opinions" of the Su-
preme Court.80 The absoluteness of 
the certitude professed by this opinion 
is probably due to irrepressible doubts 
about its accuracy. 
We can put to one side the issues 
of federal jurisdiction that will be met 
in all the cases. 81 Their determination 
will depend on the specific records 
made. We can put to one side also the 
classes of restraints designed to en-
force illegally fixed prices or systems 
of graft and extortion. The illegality 
in these cases does not arise from the 
nature of the labor activity and is as-
78 Public Statement, supra, note 70, at 6-7. 
79 Most of the proceedings thus far instituted 
involve alleged cooperation between unions and 
employers to effect restraints of competition 
among employers. 
80 Public Statement, supra, note 70, at 3, 4. 
81 See The Folk-Law of Thurman Arnold 
(1939) 8 Int. Jurid. Ass'n Bull. 53, 61. 
s2 It has been urged that even in these cases -
sumed to exist independently of it.82 
Our concern is with the other three 
classes of allegedly "unquestionable 
restraints" those dealing with "im-
proved equipment," "useless and un-
necessary labor" and jurisdictional dis-
putes. These are historic subjects of 
labor controversy. 
The Department's statement de-
clares restraints in these cases illegal 
regardless of the means by which they 
are affected, that is, whether by "boy-
cotts, strikes, or [other] coercion."83 
This legal opinion surely cannot be 
"unquestionable." Section 20 of the 
Clayton Act lists a number of acts, 
those normally used by labor, which 
shall not be "considered or held to be 
violations of any law of the United 
States" (including, of course, the Sher-
man Law). The intent of this provi-
sion was, as stated by Mr. Justice 
Brandeis in the Duplex case, to legalize 
the specified conduct under the condi-
tions stated whatever its effects and ir-
respective of judicial approval or dis-
approval of the ends to which it is di-
rected. If the supposed restraints are 
effected by means of these acts, they 
do not violate the anti-trust laws, what-
ever might otherwise be the case, if 
the controversy (a) is between "em-
ployers and employees, or between em-
ployees" and (b) involves or grows out 
of "a dispute concerning terms or con-
ditions of employment." 
the Sherman law must be held inapplicable and 
the conduct prosecuted under other statutes. 
See the letter of Henry Epstein, Solicitor Gen-
eral of New York, in the New York Times, Nov. 
26, 1939, p. 8E and his (unpublished) address at 
the Conference on Labor Problems and Rela-
tions of the National Lawyers' Guild, Washing-
ton, D. C., January 12, 1940. 
s3 Public Statement, supra, note 70, at 1. 
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Now suppose that painters refuse to 
work for an employer who requires 
them to use spraying machines rather 
than brushes; or, to take an example 
cited by the Department, suppose they 
refuse to paint kitchen walls unless 
they are also given the work of paint-
ing the kitchen cabinets.84 When their 
concerted action is limited to their own 
. refusal to work, it would seem to be 
within the immunity conferred by the 
Clayton Act, even as construed by the 
majority of the Court in the Du,plex 
case, for "terminating [a] relation of 
employment, or ... ceasing to perform 
any work or labor." Here is a dispute 
between an employer and his present 
or prospective employees; and it is a 
dispute concerning "terms or conditions 
of their own employment." They have 
no quarrel with any other employer 
and are not seeking to coerce any other 
employer. Suppose next that the 
painters by "peaceable persuasion" en-
s4 "Unreasonable restraints designed to pre-
vent the use of cheaper material, improved 
equipment, or more efficient methods. An ex-
ample is the effort to prevent the installation of 
factory-glazed windows or factory-painted 
kitchen cabinets." Public Statement, supra, 
note 70, at 4. 
This statement conveys no idea as to the pur-
pose of the effort. Prevention of the installation 
of factory-painted kitchen cabinets is not neces-
sarily the result of caprice, or dislike of fac-
tories, or desire to increase the cost of construc-
tion. The effort generally is due rather to one 
of two things: (a)· the factory employs non-
union or "enemy union" painters and/or (b) 
the house painters want the work of painting 
the cabinets, just as bricklayers wanted the 
work of pointing in Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 
572, 78 N. E. 753. In both cases the union pre-
sumably would permit the installation of the 
cabinets if its members were permitted to re-
paint them or were paid the cost of painting 
them. The Departmenfs way of putting the 
case suggests purposeless or malicious conduct 
when in fact the purpose is definite and real, 
however much people may differ as to the 
legality of the activity. The union's method may 
be short-sighted and may even defeat its aims, 
but the objective is the entirely justifiable one 
of increasing the employment of its members. 
list the support of the carpenters and 
they, too, refuse to work on buildings 
painted by spraying machines or in 
which factory painted cabinets are 
used. Is it really "unquestionable" 
that even under the dissenting opin-
ions there would not exist such com-
munity of interest between the car-
penters and the painters as to call forth 
the immunity for persuading others by 
peaceful means to cease to perform 
work or labor? In the Du,plex case, 
it may be recalled, a variety of crafts 
came to the assistance of the machin-
ists.85 
Or take the case of a jurisdictional 
dispute comprehended by the f:rfth 
category of the Department's list. When 
a minority group of employes strike 
against their own employer because he 
bargains for them with a rival union, 
the strike is the result of a dispute 
about terms and conditions of employ-
ment between parties in a proximate 
This objective must be taken into account in 
determining the legality of the conduct. See 
The Folk-Law of Thurman Arnold (1939) 8 
Inti. Jur. Ass'n Bull. 53, 63. 
85 The Department's statement seems to as-
sume that the Duplex and Bedford cases in-
volved merely the reasonableness of "refusals 
by unions to work upon goods made in non-
union shops." Public Statement, supra, note 70, 
at 3-4. To be sure, the dissenting opinion in the 
Bedford case concerned itself with the question 
of reasonableness. But that was the second line 
of defense. See supra, note 41. The first line of 
defense was built in the Duplex case on the 
Clayton Act. The issue upon which the Court 
there divided, as well as the issue upon which 
the majority differed from the courts below, was 
the existence of a labor dispute within the 
meaning of the Act. If, as the Department 
seems to suspect, the dissenting opinion in the 
Duplex case states the law that will prevail 
when the issue is reconsidered by the Court, 
then probably all three categories of restraints 
which the Department deems "unquestionable 
violations of the Sherman Act" present cases 
"between employers and employees or between 
employees" involving disputes about "terms or 
conditions of employment" within the Clayton 
Act. The issue of reasonableness may then not 
be reached at all. 
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relation to the dispute even under the 
majority opinion in the Duplex case. 
And i£ the strikers' conduct is limited 
to refusal to work and peaceable per-
suasion o£ others, it is immune under 
the Clayton Act. If we take the next 
step and assume that the members o£ 
one union refuse to handle, or work on, 
goods produced by members o£ a rival 
or enemy union, the legality o£ the con-
duct would depend upon the issue o£ 
proximity or community o£ interest. 
The Supreme Court's decisions under 
the Norris-LaGuardia Act indicate im-
munity £rom, rather than violation o£, 
the Sherman Law in these cases.86 
One legal flaw in the Department's 
position, then, is that it £ails to note 
the £act that the Clayton Act legalizes 
certain labor activity regardless o£ its 
aims or its harmful effects on others. 
But even i£ the activity is legal only 
when directed towards ends deemed 
legally reasonable, there is "responsible 
judicial authority" to justify some of 
the conduct proscribed by the Depart-
ment's policy. 
One month prior to the issuance of 
the Department's statement of policy, 
a federal district court in Louisiana 
sa Fur Workers Union No. 21238 v. Fur Work-
ers Union, Local No. 72, 60 S. Ct. 292 (1939) 
and cases there cited. 
87 Terrio v. S. N. Nielson Construction Co., 30 
F. Supp. 77 (E. D. La. 1939). 
ss Nann v. Raimist, 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 
690 (1931); Stillwell Theatres, Inc. v. Kaplan, 
259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932) ; J. H. & S. 
Theatres v. Fay, 260 N. Y. 315, 183 N. E. 509 
(1932); and see Exchange Bakery v. Rifkin, 245 
N.Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927). 
89 Opera On Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 17 N. Y. S. 
(2d) 144 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1940). See Scott- · 
Stafford Opera House Co. v. Minneapolis Musi-
cians Ass'n, 118 Minn. 410, 136 N. W. 1092 (1912) 
and Empire Theatre Co. v. Cloke, 53 Mont. 183, 
163 Pac. 107 (1917) (union rule fixing minimum 
number of members for orchestra). 
DO "In any event, we see no reason why it is 
held that concerted labor action in the 
course o£ a jurisdictional dispute like 
that which is the basis o£ an indictment 
recently procured by the Department 
is not a violation o£ the anti-trust 
laws. 87 At least since 1931 the New 
York Court o£ Appeals has permitted, 
as a matter of common law, some forms 
o£ concerted action against an employer 
in the course o£ a jurisdictional dispute 
by a union rival to that with which he 
had an established and legitimate 
system o£ collective bargaining.88 Even 
after the Department's policy was 
announced, the New York Appellate 
Division permitted coercive action by 
unions o£ musicians, stage hands, and 
choral singers to compel an opera 
exhibitor to retain a live orchestra after 
he switched to canned music.89 To the 
argument that the union was seeking 
to impede technological progress the 
court answered in effect that the long 
run benefits of such progress do not 
appease present hunger.90 And the 
highest court o£ New Jersey has toler-
ated some concerted action to compel 
the continuance o£ older and less effi-
cient methods which gave the workers 
involved greater present employment.g1 
not a legitimate object of workingmen to at-
tempt by lawful means to limit such alleged 
'progress' when it results in direct injury to 
them. Economic pressure may eventually com-
pel the acceptance of mechanical changes, but 
there seems to be no legal reason why those 
who may be injuriously affected thereby may 
not meanwhile make lawful and orderly efforts 
to prevent or lessen the e.'ttent of the injury 
to themselves. It is well known that employers 
do not always use the latest technological im-
provements where such improvements might 
lessen their opportunity for profits or destroy 
large capital investments; and no one claims that 
they owe any one a legal duty to do so." Id., 
at 152. 
91 Bayer v. Brotherhood of Painters, etc. of 
America, 108 N. J. Eq. 257, 154 Atl. 759 (1931). 
See the material cited in Landis, Cases on Labor 
Law (1934) 351, n. 1. 
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Agreement as to the long run uneco-
nomic character of the named practices 
does not necessarily mean agreement 
on the desirability of prohibiting them 
by law. 
The Department's economic position 
surely has sound support. Some of the 
labor strife to which it is addressed is 
extremely painful-to genuine friends 
of organized labor perhaps even more 
so than to its enemies. Patience with 
such situations is often a costly virtue 
and is always sorely pressed by power 
anxious to do something. But an un-
wise exercise of power may cause more 
harm than good. And in labor law, 
expansive, vague prohibition is particu-
larly inappropriate. 
A description of labor activity as 
designed to prevent the use of more 
efficient methods or to compel the hir-
ing of useless and unnecessary labor 
tends to substitute epithet for reality. 
It is reminiscent of earlier descriptions 
of labor combinations as malicious or 
formed for the purpose of injuring 
another. Like the symbol secondary 
boycott, such phrases tend to impede 
thought and conceal judgment and 
error. The description emphasizes the 
verbal form of labor's demand rather 
than the thing labor wants. And it 
leaves tremendous scope for differences 
of opinion and personal choice. 
The Department states that it will 
not find violation of the Sherman Law 
in demands for high wages or short 
hours even when it is charged that 
these will unduly increase costs and 
9z See Landis, op. cit. supra, note 91; Nationai 
Resources Committee, Technological Trends and 
National Policy (1937) 39-67; Stern, Restraints 
Upon the Utilization of Inventions, (Nov., 1938) 
200 Ann. Am. Acad. of Pol. & Soc. Sci. 13. 
93 David Ricardo, On Machinery, in McCul-
prices and retard production. Yet a 
demand for the hiring of so-called use-
less and unnecessary labor may be but 
an inartistic and clumsy way of ex-
pressing a desire for shorter hours or 
spreading of employment opportunities. 
And resistance to improved equip-
ment or more efficient methods may be 
but a way of expressing, without the 
aid of a lawyer, the desire for contin-
ued employment and earnings. Both 
may be but means of safeguarding 
labor from receiving the entire imme-
diate shock of technological change. 
Workers' resistance to technological 
change is not a new phenomenon just 
uncovered in the building investiga-
tion. 92 Nor is the resistance "founded 
on prejudice and error."93 "Invention 
is a great disturber."94 Its undoubted 
benefits are bought with the price of 
maladjustment and hardship upon 
those who are unprepared to weather 
the disturbance. At least part of the 
price is paid by labor "since many of 
the new machines and techniques re-
sult in 'occupational obsolescence'."95 
And labor, like others in the same situ-
ation, has sought to reduce that price. 
"Among unorganized workers," states 
a recent authoritative survey, "action 
is often directed against the machine 
itself as the immediate cause of their 
degradation, with the result that ma-
chine wrecking occurs. Trade-unions 
reject the tactic of destroying machin-
ery and seek to substitute organized 
measures of bargaining with employers 
to lessen the impact of the tragedy of 
loch, Works of David Ricardo (2d ed., 1852) 
235, 239. 
~National Resources Committee, op. cit. 
supra, note 92 at viii. 
95 Id., at ix. 
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displacement through the more gradual 
introduction of the machinery or pro-
cess, and by demands for compensation 
to those displaced."06 
Labor is but one factor, and not the _ 
most important, in the total resistance 
to the utilization of invention and 
technological change. 97 Investors com-
bined in a corporation are also reluc-
tant to adopt innovations which involve 
large costs of obsolescence. Charges 
have many times been made of preda-
tory suppression of patents to protect 
existing plant and investment. Whether 
such charges are true or false, it is 
considered not predatory, but part of 
good business management, to intro-
duce new technologies in such ways as 
to reduce the cost to investors.98 "Al-
though an innovation may be more 
efficient than the processes already in 
use, it may be, temporarily at least, less 
economic."99 The National Resources 
Committee cites an industrial study in 
1934 of "better-than-average" indus-
trial power plants. Sixty-two percent 
of the equipment in these plants was 
more than ten years old and twenty-
five percent over 20 years old. "The 
bulk of the equipment was regarded as 
obsolete to such an extent that, by re-
placing it by facilities of the most 
advanced design, fifty cents could be 
saved, on the average, out of each 
dollar spent in the older plants for 
industrial power."100 Labor has at 
least the same interest in continued 
employment that investors have in the 
security of their investments. 
96 Id., at 64. 
111 Id., at 59. 
os Cf. Paper Bag Patent Case, 210 U. S. 405, 
429 (1908). 
oo Stern, op. cit. supra, note 92, at 29. 
100 National Resources Committee, op. cit. 
Resistance to technological change 
may be legally permissible even when 
not economically justifiable. But both 
legal and economic justification must 
take account of a variety of circum-
stances other than the fact that the 
resistance is to "cheaper material, 
improved equipment, or more effi-
cient methods." When sound films 
were first introduced two motion pic-
ture operators were required for each 
exhibition. Technical improvements 
have made it completely unnecessary, 
it is said, to have more than one oper-
ator. Yet the operators' union requires 
some exhibitors to continue the em-
ployment of two men. Exhibitors say 
also that when they abandoned stage 
shows completely, they were still re-
quired to retain a stage hand with 
nothing for him to do. And on the 
legitimate stage there are said to be 
regularly accepted instances of so-
called unnecessary labor. Impressions 
from the building industry, which fur-
nished the occasion for the Depart-
ment's statement, are not safe guides 
in the theatrical business.101 Again, in 
the railroad industry, collective agree-
ments over a long period of years 
developed regularly accepted practices 
whereby employees may be paid for 
hours in which they did not work or 
for runs which they did not make. To 
dislodge these practices would require 
something akin to a revolution. Rail-
road consolidation has long been urged 
as a means of achieving spectacular 
economies in railroad transportation. 
supra, note 92, at 12. See also note 90, supra. 
101 C£. the report of Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Thurman Arnold: "A program which may 
be sound for, let us say, motion pictures, may 
be useless or positively harmful for steel." Ann. 
Rep. of Atty. Gen. (1938) 65. 
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By the Emergency Railroad Transpor-
tation Act of 1933102 Congress sought 
to encourage it. But Congress express-
ly forbade reduction of employment by 
exercise of the authority conferred.103 
The impact of technological change 
on occupational skills and labor em-
ployment presents one of our major 
and enduring social problems. The 
Sherman Law provides no guides to 
the solution; the tools which it offers 
are awkward and unsuited to the task. 
Nor will we find in the Sherman Law 
the Messiah to unite the errant A. F. 
of L. and C. I. 0. and rid us of "juris-
dictional disputes." That term, too, is 
of dangerously vague signification.10'1 
Some jurisdictional disputes may be 
merely struggles between selfish lead-
ers for the perquisites of labor leader-
ship. Others may be competition be-
tween groups of employees for given 
work. Still others may represent strug-
gles on the part of minority or rank 
and file members of unions to procure 
reforms and changes of policies within 
their organizations. And others yet 
may be attempts to increase labor's 
power in bargaining with employers. 
The Bedford case, for example, though 
taken by the Department to deal with 
a boycott of non-union goods, may 
properly be regarded as a jurisdictional 
dispute within the fifth category of the 
Department's statement. Bedford's em-
ployees were organized into a form of 
union with which Bedford had estab-
102 June 16, 1933, c. 91, 48 Stat. 211. 
1oa Id., §7 (b): "The nun1ber of employees in 
the service of a carrier shall not be reduced by 
reason of any action taken pursuant to the au-
thority of this title . . . ; nor shall any em-
ployee in such service be deprived of employ-
ment such as he had . . . or be in a worse 
position with respect to his compensation for 
lished a system of collective bargain-
ing that was then entirely legitimate; 
and the defendants were seeking to 
destroy it. 
Jurisdictional disputes are older than 
the Sherman Law and almost as old as 
trade unionism.105 It was not desue-
tude of the Sherman Law that has left 
them with us or that has kept the A. F. 
of L. and C. I. 0. apart despite the 
efforts of our chief government officers 
and other responsible persons. Describ-
ing jurisdictional disputes as efforts 
"to destroy . . . established and legit-
imate system [ s] of collective bargain-
ing" tends to attach to them the oppro-
brium of undermining the polic~r of 
the National Labor Relations Act. The 
further statement, that "restraints of 
trade for such a purpose are unreason-
able whether undertaken by a union 
or by an employer,"106 seeks to create 
a disarming appearance of equal treat-
ment. Yet it is surprising news, to say 
the least, that an employer who locks 
out a union or causes a strike by form-
ing a company dominated union or l:iy 
discrimination against union members 
is guilty of a violation o£ the anti-trust 
laws. Availability of the Sherman Law 
to protect the workers' interest in col-
lective bargaining against impairment 
.by employer or union is indeed novel. 
Perhaps the N. L. R. A. was really an 
employers' measure to relieve them 
from the harsh restrictions of the 
Sherman Law. 
such employment, by reason of any action taken 
pursuant to the authority conferred by this 
title." 
104 C£. Hough, J. in Gill Engraving Co. v. 
Doerr, 214 Fed. lll, 118 (S. D. N. Y., 1914). 
1os See Jaffe, Inter-Union Disputes in Search 
of a For= (1940) 49 Yale L. J. 424. 
1os Public Statement, note 70, supra, at 5. 
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In formulating public policy with 
reference to jurisdictional disputes, the 
N. L. R. A. is certainly a factor of 
importance. Many think that, with the 
right of collective bargaining protected 
by law, it is time to restrain the abuses 
in the internal government of unions 
and the internecine wars between 
unions. Few believe that the N. L. 
R. A., even if it survives current efforts 
at amendment, is the last word in labor 
relations. Additional machinery for 
adjustment of labor disputes between 
- employers and employees or between 
employees is doubtless necessary and 
coming. But the machinery must be 
specially designed for the job. To use 
the anti-trust laws for this purpose 
seems quixotic. The statement that 
"the principle applicable to unions is 
the same as that applicable to other 
groups specially protected by law"107 
is not merely abstract rhetoric; it is 
oversimplified and misleading. It was 
not true in the past and is not true 
now. Our anti-trust laws, except to the 
extent that they exempt labor activity, 
are not oriented in labor policy or 
correlated with other provisions for 
industrial disputes. They do not pro-
vide for negotiation, mediation, com-
promise, arbitration or adjustment,-
the tools fashioned by experience for 
labor controversies. Their enforcement 
is not confined to the Department of 
Justice or any other single agency. 
101 Id., at 6. 
10s The peculiar effect of these remedies in 
labor cases is well known. See Frankfurter and 
Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930) 47 et seq. 
100 See, e. g., Oreg. L. 1939, c. 2, p. 7; Wis. L. 
1939, c. 25, p. 33, c. 57, p. 77. 
Their method of extensive litigation, 
with or without temporary injunctions 
and restraining orders/08 is wholly un-
suited to the crisis situations involved 
in labor disputes and the limited finan-
cial resources of labor organizations. 
If applied to labor activity, they do not 
supplement or supplant state law but 
rather overlap that law without plan 
or reason. 
The Department's statement of pol-
icy seeks to give to the anti-trust laws 
a new turn in the field of labor and 
to impose restrictions upon their avail-
ability. But the restrictions are at best 
uncertain and are in any event not 
within the control of the Department 
either for the present or for the future. 
The effort reemphasizes the relation of 
the Sherman Law to labor disputes and 
recalls the policy, steadily strengthened 
during the :Law's fifty years, to with-
draw the aims of labor action from the 
requirement of judicial approval or 
disapproval. The occasion is ripe for 
a return of the Sherman Law to its 
historic objects, combinations of capital 
and business competition. That would 
not leave labor activity uncontrolled, 
when not in cooperation with capital 
combinations. Until Congress enacts a 
national policy, that activity is subject 
to the many controls of state law. And 
recent state legislation 109 and decisions 
of state courts110 indicate no undue 
tolerance of undesirable labor strife. 
110 Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Em-
ployees' Union, 281 N. Y. 150, 22 N. E. (2d) 320 
(1939); People v. Bellows, 281 N. Y. 67, 22 N. E. 
(2d) 479 (1939); Meadowmoor Dairies v. Milk 
Wagon Drivers' Union, 371 ill. 377, 21 N. E. (2d) 
308 (1939). 
